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14. ABSTRACT Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been operating in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for nearly six years. Their efforts play a tremendous role in improving security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations and they continue to prove their value to commanders as effective units driving positive change for the future of both Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, there is no established doctrine to guide PRTs in training, planning, preparing, and executing the mission they are assigned. There exists a compelling need for the promulgation of a single source of operational joint doctrine that can serve the multitude of civil and military entities involved with the operations of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams:
The Compelling Need for Joint Doctrine**

by

William D. Fraser

LCDR, USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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04 May 2009

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Abstract

Provincial Reconstruction Teams: The Compelling Need for Joint Doctrine

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been operating in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for nearly six years. Their efforts play a tremendous role in improving security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations and they continue to prove their value to commanders as effective units driving positive change for the future of both Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, there is no established doctrine to guide PRTs in training, planning, preparing, and executing the mission they are assigned. There exists a compelling need for the promulgation of a single source of operational joint doctrine that can serve the multitude of civil and military entities involved with the operations of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

*“Military planners might choose to consider the initial conventional combat phase as the shaping phase, rather than the decisive phase. . . . [I]f our political objectives can only be accomplished after a successful stability phase, then the stability phase is, de facto, the decisive phase.”*¹

INTRODUCTION

Based on a concept that was developed in the summer of 2002, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have operated in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for nearly six years.² Their efforts play a tremendous role in security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations and they continue to prove their value to commanders as effective units driving positive change for the future of both Iraq and Afghanistan. PRTs were conceptually designed to achieve three fundamental objectives. First, they are charged with the responsibility of improving security at the provincial governmental level through the training, support, and mentoring of host nation security forces. Second, they play a large role in extending the reach of local governments by strengthening their authority and influence. And lastly, through extensive interagency cooperation, they facilitate rebuilding and reconstruction within priority provinces.³ Considering the importance of the mission assigned, and the number of PRTs currently in place, it is readily apparent that the Joint Force Commander cannot deny that these teams are critical operational forces that have the potential to achieve many operational and even strategic objectives within the theater. Unfortunately, military commanders are tasked with

¹ U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars* (draft), January 2004, p. 4, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/print/what-is-a-small-war/>

² Michael J. McNerney “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” From *Parameters*, Winter 2005-06, pp. 32-46.

³ Department of State, Department of Defense, and US Agency for International Development, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*, 2006. p. 8.

carrying out this mission without doctrine and with guidance that is piecemeal and varied in scope and applicability.

After the Vietnam War, joint forces, and particularly the U.S. Army, failed to codify years of counterinsurgency experience. This failure ultimately resulted in the failure of U.S. Joint Forces to recognize and adapt to the burgeoning insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Until the 2006 publication of the Army's FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual, there were significant deficits of synergy, organization, training and execution in combating these insurgencies. In the foreword of the FM 3-24, Generals David Petraeus (USA) and James Amos (USMC) state, "this manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap... it is essential that we give [Soldiers and Marines] a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations."⁴ Through the publication of the FM 3-24 and the soon to be released Joint Publication 3-24, the U.S. military is finally correcting a mistake and in-turn making our fighting forces more effective. It is incumbent that U.S. forces do not repeat mistakes. It is time that joint doctrine is developed to enable PRTs with the codification of effective guidelines for training, planning, preparing, and executing the mission they have been assigned.

The PRT mission is distinctly unique to joint forces and interagency partners, requiring special skills, techniques, and procedures that are required to bridge together several aspects of a nation's functions to achieve established objectives. PRTs coordinate extensively with host nation political, military, and private sector leaders to improve governance, economic development, justice systems, and security institutions. The overarching focus of the PRT is to build and improve upon the infrastructure within

⁴ U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 15 December 2006) Foreword.

provinces or districts they are assigned. Constructing schools, roads, clinics, etc. serves to empower the local populace while building credibility for the United States. These are the intangible results that PRTs are capable of producing. The ethereal tasks associated with effective nation-building are challenging and require resolute effort on the part of the military forces, numerous civilian agencies, and most importantly, the leaders of the host nation government.

The thesis of this paper is that there exists a compelling need for the promulgation of a single source of operational joint doctrine that can serve the multitude of civil and military entities involved with the operations of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

METHODOLOGY

This paper addresses the extent current PRT operations are utilized and the mission they are tasked to perform. It also addresses the applicability of joint doctrine and how it pertains to the training, planning, preparing, and execution of their mission. Justification for doctrine is substantiated and shortfalls are identified in the current PRT mission to further highlight how doctrine can maximize the effectiveness of PRT operations. Various sources of best practices and lessons learned are also discussed that may be used as references for the development of doctrine. This paper concludes with recommendations aimed toward the development of dedicated joint doctrine for PRT operations.

DOCTRINE IS IMPORTANT

There currently are 26 PRTs operating in Afghanistan with the U.S. leading 12 of those teams.⁵ These twelve teams (6 USN / 6 USAF teams) are staffed by U.S. military (Active and Reserve) troops from the lead service, Reserve Civil Affairs troops, a small number of active duty U.S. Army personnel, and security forces provided by National Guard units. Only the Integrated Command Teams currently feature civilians – Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The announced and expected civilian surge for Afghanistan may impact this but the PRTs will remain military in theme.⁶ In Iraq, there are 31 PRT teams of which 28 are U.S. led.⁷ PRTs in Iraq differ, relative to Afghanistan, in that teams are generally led by U.S. State Department personnel with heavy reliance on U.S. military forces to provide security, food, housing, and support. The common thread between PRTs operating in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military commanders have the authority (“responsibility”) for providing these services. Thus far, U.S. Congress has appropriated \$32.9 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction and development projects since 2002.⁸ As of August 2007, U.S. government annual spending was approximately \$20 million per PRT in Afghanistan.⁹

Every operational joint doctrine publication has a preface with three paragraphs defining scope, purpose, and application of doctrine. These paragraphs explain that doctrine

⁵ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2009, p. 9.

⁶ M. J. Tynch, CDR, USN, Current PRT Commander, Kunar Province. E-mail message to author 2 May 2009.

⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq*. October 1, 2008, p. 2.

⁸ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, April 9, 2009, p. 2.

⁹ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2009, p. 54.

governs activities and performance, aids in interagency coordination, and offers guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders. Doctrine serves as an authoritative source guiding planning, resourcing, training, and execution and is not designed to impose restrictions on force organization. It also provides authoritative information that is applicable to operational functions of the military.¹⁰ Being authoritative in nature means it is not designed to hamstring commanders with specific rules for operations. Doctrine has roots in theory, history, and best practices. Through these, guiding principles are identified and eventually codified. Doctrine is designed to be flexible and is constantly reviewed to ensure that its application is still current and valid. Usually, doctrine is focused around a specific operational concept and outlines the concept through definitions, fundamental functions, and depending on the need, various topics related to the performance of the mission. Given that joint military institutions develop these publications, doctrine also serves to inform other government agencies who participate with the military during operations. In essence, doctrine is the foundation that the U.S. military uses to educate fighting forces and to pass on years of experience from generation to generation.

For any theater of operations, there can be multiple units using doctrinal principles that specifically apply to their operational subset. For example, some combat units operating in Afghanistan find it germane to use doctrine written for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations in the Joint Publication 3-24 “Counter-Insurgency Operations.” Additionally, the numerous Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Intergovernmental Organizations (IOs) operating in Afghanistan refer to JP 3-08, the “Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organizational Coordination During Joint Operations”

¹⁰ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations* Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. (Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 September 2006, incorporating Ch. 1, 13 February 2008), p. i.

publication as well as the JP-3-57 “Civil-Military Operations” publication. These publications all provide extensive information related to their specific topic. The topics may be very specific in scope, or may cover a broad range of operational functions. In any case, each one of these doctrinal publications has had considerable time to mature, has evolved significantly over the past few years, and has been modified and rewritten numerous times.

Unfortunately, authoritative, doctrinal principles on the employment of PRTs do not exist. The initial draft of the joint COIN publication includes an appendix that, over four pages, briefly highlights the PRT mission, fundamental guidelines, and command and control.¹¹ Similarly, the Civil-Military Operations (CMO) publication gives PRTs a brief, glossed over description and has a few inserts highlighting their establishment in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹² Surprisingly, mention of PRTs in the JP 3-16 “Multi-National Operations” publication is more or less anecdotal but identifies organizations such as PRTs as providing unique “force-multiplier” capabilities to the overall Multi-National Task Force (MNTF) CMO.¹³ Joint Publication 3-08 “Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organizational Coordination During Joint Operations” has several mentions of “reconstruction,” but does not mention PRTs in either of its two volumes.¹⁴

In summation, lack of instructional, authoritative doctrine may ultimately translate to a lack of effectiveness in execution of the mission. Applying a specific example, if a PRT commander had simple questions regarding command and control of a team, he or she would

¹¹ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Draft of *Counterinsurgency Operations* Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 (Washington, DC: CJCS, Draft).

¹² Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Civil Military Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 8 July 2008).

¹³ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Multi-National Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 7 March 2007).

¹⁴ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 March 2006).

find that the information may exist in sources associated with host nation employment of PRTs, but nothing exists in U.S. joint doctrine.

PRT OPERATIONS JUSTIFY REQUIREMENT FOR JOINT DOCTRINE

The recent accomplishments of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq deem them relevant, and future successes may depend on clearly delineated concepts relating to the broad scope of capabilities that PRTs bring to the table. In 2003, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) experienced very limited success as a conventional war. In response to this, strategists developed what we now know as the PRT concept. Initially, this idea intended to win the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan population was seen as a means of burden sharing and sought to extend the reach of the NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond the city of Kabul. These teams identified local problems, generally of humanitarian nature, and then established relationships with United Nations Administrative Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in the field. Together they engaged in various reconstruction projects and in turn, gathered information within the provinces. In the beginning of 2003 the teams were officially established with the moniker “Provincial Reconstruction Teams.”¹⁵

PRTs continue to gain support for achievements that have included the 250 development projects with 199 (valued at \$20 million) ongoing as of March 2008. Secretary Gates and U.S. commanders have acknowledged these successes citing PRTs’ ability to

¹⁵ Robert M. Perito, United States Institute for Peace, “The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,” Special Report; 152 Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2005. p. 3.

intensify reconstruction by coordinating many different security and civilian activities. Schools are now open in Ghazni, whereas one year ago many were closed due to security concerns. Secretary Gates stated on December 11, 2007, that PRT road building and construction of district centers in Khost that tie the population to the government led to a dramatic improvement in security in 2007.¹⁶

Another extraordinarily positive aspect of PRTs is the fact that they are eagerly supported by allies and coalition forces. Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, France, Italy, Turkey, and the Czech Republic are all currently engaged in PRT operations. It is anticipated that South Korea will soon take over operations of the U.S. led PRT at Bagram Air Base. Recently there have also been efforts to shift leadership of certain PRTs to civilians. In 2006, the U.S. led PRT in Panjshir Valley was transferred to civilian authority.¹⁷ A concept to increase legitimacy of local government has obviously gained legitimacy for the PRT itself.

Contrary to what developed nations in the west may want to believe, PRTs will be operating for many years to come. From an Afghan perspective, PRTs are regarded as permanently installed international charities and reliable sources of employment. Until the Afghan government can sustain itself and establish credibility, PRTs may be operating in Afghanistan for the next 10 to 20 years.¹⁸

¹⁶ Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Service report for Congress, September 29, 2008, p. 32.

¹⁷ Ibid p. 33.

¹⁸ Markus Gauster, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Innovative Instrument of International Crisis Management Being Put to the Test*. Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. 2008. p. 9.

DOCTRINE NEEDED FOR TRAINING, PLANNING, PREPARING, AND EXECUTING

Currently, PRT forces conduct stateside training with the units they will be deployed with prior to their movement overseas. This training is focused on leadership, basic language skills, basic combat, and Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) instruction. Early on in the employment of PRTs, units deploying to Afghanistan may have found that much of their instruction was oriented toward Iraqi scenarios, but that has changed for the better. Many Afghan ex-patriots are now involved in the unit-level training that culminates in a week long exercise focusing on PRT missions and challenges.

PRT Commander training is slightly different. In addition to their unit level training, they also conduct a two week Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) with the second week conducted in-country. Additionally, once the commander is in-country, another 10-14 days of Relief In Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) turnover is conducted. One PRT Commander said the turnover was weak and identified the process as a shortfall simply because of the difficulties associated with communication and team integration.¹⁹

Another noteworthy shortfall is the lack of continuity in theater due to the short tour lengths of PRT Commanders and the Reservists in each team. Constraints currently allow for a twelve month mobilization of reservists which consists of three months of training and nine months as an active team in country. Limited continuity of effort exists only through the civilian representatives established in the provinces. The civilian representatives who maintain this continuity must be involved to assist the development of teams into effective

¹⁹ Interviews with CDR Jason Burke, former PRT Commander in Ghazni, Afghanistan and CDR M. J. Tynch, Current PRT Commander, Kunar Province.

units in a short period of time. These factors are predictable, and if planned and addressed in joint doctrine, a more seamless transition to operations may take place during the training.

In order to increase legitimacy and maximize effectiveness, doctrine should acknowledge the host nation development strategy as the source document for planning. For example, the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) outlines how the nation perceives itself and establishes a “roadmap” of prioritized goals for national development.

Chapter two of the ANDS directly addresses planning issues and priorities pertinent to the employment of PRTs in Afghanistan. This extensive document discusses the consultation process for development on the national, sub-national, international, and private sector levels. From this consultation, a detailed analysis of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan was conducted and Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) were created. The planning process analyzed government policy formation, prioritization, sequencing and needs-related resource allocation based on the varying needs of the 34 provinces. The factors considered in each province included agriculture, security, education, governance, health, the private sector, roads, infrastructure (energy and water), and social protection.²⁰

Use and understanding of this document is critical for PRTs operating in Afghanistan. The ANDS directly addresses the concerns of the people with these PDPs and projects a clear vision for their future. PRT planning, training, and preparing for the mission in Afghanistan is sufficiently enhanced as a direct result of the ANDS. However, doctrine should not only identify a national development strategy for effective planning, it should also incorporate inputs from civilian humanitarian organizations into PRT planning.

²⁰ Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Secretariat Gul Khana Palace (Sedarat) Kabul, Afghanistan. p. 17-22.

In 2001, the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) expressed how they believed civil-military operations should interact with the military. They proposed that direct humanitarian aid should, under ordinary circumstances, be reserved for civilian aid organizations; use of military assistance/protection should be provided only in high-risk areas; and that only special information (e.g. concerning the security situation) can and should be exchanged between civilian and military actors.²¹ These ideas that existed eight years ago remain prevalent today even though they are not consistent with PRT operations. These highlighted biases continue to place distance between the two entities.

PRTs depend on the synergistic interaction of civilian and military personnel to accomplish objectives. Civilian organizations operating with PRTs often wish to appear neutral, choosing to avoid putting a military face on civilian projects. This essentially sets them up to be isolated in insecure environments and potentially places these civilians at risk. Security provided by PRTs needs to be coordinated and implemented in concert with NGO missions. There are instances when military strategy and/or operations may be counterproductive to NGO mission goals. Limitations on information sharing is an often cited problem regarding civil-military (CM) relations. For this reason, joint doctrinal guidance for sharing of information is vital to the development and furthering of strategy that runs parallel with NGO operations.

Doctrine should also discuss conditions of the operational environment that should exist before PRTs are implemented. Security, as it pertains to PRTs and their relationships with NGOs and IOs, needs to be clearly defined.

²¹ Markus Gauster, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Innovative Instrument of International Crisis Management Being Put to the Test*. Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. 2008. p.34.

*The military emphasizes national security, public order, and force protection—all of which are enhanced by assertively addressing and reducing the sources of threat. Civilian assistance providers, on the other hand, equate security with ensuring that belligerents do not perceive them as a threat.*²²

Without security, the ability for a team to devote time, manpower and assistance to reconstruction is diminished. Without security, the NGO mission itself is at risk.

Defining the civil-military relationship serves to create an effective *team* and delineating joint doctrine for the “team building” aspect of operations will only enhance these CM relationships. As PRT operations continue, these relationships become more refined. It is critical that this knowledge is captured through more than just lessons learned. In the development of PRT joint doctrine, much of the information can be taken directly from JP-08, but there are specific characteristics of PRT operations that need more clarity and specificity as they pertain to the use of PRTs in stability and reconstruction operations.

The PRT focus of effort is geared toward the development of a stable and secure environment.²³ Reconstruction not only has the ability to increase stability, it also serves to empower the host nation’s population by giving them a direct “buy-in” to both the physical and social rebuilding of their society. A greater gain exists when a project builds more than a physical structure. The technical expertise and manpower experience gained, while building a bridge for example, has enduring effects for society. When capable PRTs accomplish these seemingly minor projects, these enduring effects further manifest themselves in the increased legitimacy and effectiveness of the governments of the host nation.

²² Michael J. Dziedzic, and Michael K. Seidl, United States Institute of Peace. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and Non-governmental Organizations in Afghanistan,” Special Report; 147; Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2005. p. 2.

²³ International Security Assistance Force, *Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook*, Edition 3, February 3, 2007. p. 2.

POSSIBLE FOUNDATIONS FOR PRT DOCTRINE

Although PRT doctrine is lacking, there are three PRT specific manuals accompanied by volumes of lessons learned and best practices which have been gathered over the last five years. From these sources alone, a definitive Joint Doctrine can be developed. Currently, the best guidance provided to PRT commanders exists within the *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) PRT Handbook*, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) *PRTs in Iraq*, and the CALL's *PRT Playbook*.

The *PRT Handbook* is currently the primary document that guides PRTs in their operations in Afghanistan and explains aspects of structure that is not covered in either of the other two manuals. The opening pages of the manual clarify in great detail what a PRT is and is not. It also highlights that the function of a PRT is analogous to “scaffolding,” an interim structure designed to help build the capacity of the government to govern and deliver essential public services, such as security, law and order, justice, health care, education, development and so on.²⁴ The ISAF mandate is presented upfront followed by the ISAF PRT mission statement which has been incorporated into the ISAF Operational Plan:

*Provincial Reconstruction Teams will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.*²⁵

The *Handbook* is broken into two parts. The first part directly addresses concept, intent, implementation of strategy, and management and structure. The second half of the manual is a compilation of various references that are relevant to PRT challenges and activities.²⁶ The second half also has numerous case studies that demonstrate best practices,

²⁴ PRT Handbook, p. 5.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 2.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 1.

lessons learned as well as pitfalls to avoid. The manual is easy to read and provides a great deal of information specific to PRTs in Afghanistan. This manual has earned a great deal of credibility and is more detailed than its OIF counterpart, *PRTs in Iraq*

What is now the *PRT Playbook*, builds off of the *PRT Handbook*, but has also compiled some additional information from CALL's *PRTs in Iraq* in order to be to non-nation specific. Published in September 2007, the *Playbook* is an outstanding reference that provides a wealth of information for both military leaders and interagency players. The *Playbook* has over 140 pages of information pertinent to both Iraq and Afghanistan. CALL identifies it as a "living document" and encourages individuals to discuss and suggest changes on their dedicated portal website "prtportal.org."²⁷ It is well written and provides "how to" guidance on the administrative and operational aspects of running a PRT. It is stated in the foreword that it is not a doctrinal document, but it follows very close to accepted doctrinal structure.²⁸

The *Playbook* is comprised of six chapters of information that explains much of what the first section of the ISAF *Handbook* does, but it is not nation specific. There are four annexes that contain supporting reference information, Afghanistan PRT information, Iraq PRT information, and finally nearly 40 pages of best practices. This manual also highlights in two separate sections concepts that were mentioned earlier in this paper; "How to Operate as a Team" and "Information Sharing."

While these documents provide outstanding information and guidance, they contain perishable data that is specific to only Iraq and Afghanistan. Doctrine built from these

²⁷ Center for Army Lessons Learned (U.S.). 2007. *PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Combined Arms Center (CAC). p. ii.

²⁸ Ibid, Foreword.

sources has the capacity to transcend current operations and provide a solid foundation for generations to build on.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In researching this paper, it was determined that there exists a need for a single source of joint doctrine from which PRTs will benefit in planning, training, preparing and executing. The last several years' experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the future operational requirements for PRTs validate this requirement. When these operations are completed, without the proper inculcation of the lessons learned through PRT operational experience, we risk losing valuable knowledge. Current PRT operations are well established and continue to receive a great deal of funding. Host nations view PRTs as vital to reconstruction efforts and have become highly reliant on the PRT mission and its impact on national development strategy. The research of this paper found that creation of joint doctrine, dedicated to PRT operations, is required to ensure that PRTs are employed effectively with extensive interagency cooperation.

Training continues to evolve with time, but significant shortfalls need to be addressed in doctrine to improve the process and enhance continuity of effort. Planning for PRT operations should be guided by the host nation development strategy and published doctrine must highlight this document as the primary source for planning, funding and allocation of resources.

Civil-military relationships are critical to the success of PRTs and information from existing sources of joint doctrine must be used to develop PRT doctrine. Specifically, JP 3-08 should be used as the basis for defining the PRT civil-military relationship.

Doctrinal development should draw from the information that already exists and the *ISAF PRT Handbook* and CALL's *PRT Playbook* should be the primary references for developing joint doctrine. These are excellent resources that are based on extensive experience and the *Playbook* is already written in a non-nation specific format following a doctrinal outline. Lessons learned and best practices from these manuals must also be incorporated in this doctrine to ensure that teams are trained adequately and efficiently for the mission.

Interagency involvement is critical to the development, training, planning, resourcing, and execution of PRT operations; therefore, doctrinal development should be staffed by interagency personnel as well as those in each branch of the armed services to ensure its effectiveness and enable solid partnership for future PRT operations.

COUNTER ARGUMENT

Some believe that it is not even possible to draw general conclusions from PRT operations to develop doctrine due to lack of strategic overview, agreed measures of effectiveness, and guidelines for civil-military relations as well as a proliferation of national sponsors, inconsistent models, and divergent operating environments.²⁹ Problems associated with funding sources, lack of unity with interagency partnerships, and in limitations on Rules of Engagement cooperating with our international partners create additional issues that further complicate the PRT mission.³⁰ Additionally, some argue that the current dynamic environment does not permit standardization at this point. They argue that flexibility is a PRT's greatest strength and that the conditions on the ground dictate that each PRT conduct operations with varying strategies to enable maximum effect.

These critiques are valid, but the points mentioned are issues that, as discussed in this paper, doctrine can address. Strategic overview needs to be reflected by the national development strategy; and coordination and partnership relations must be critically evaluated and incorporated into doctrine. The PRT mission is highly defined at this point and though measures of effectiveness may not be empirical in nature, success has been acknowledged and the PRT model has been established. Flexibility is a critical characteristic of PRT functionality, but doctrine need not detract from that. The FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* manual stands as an excellent example of doctrine that maintains flexibility and does not detract from a commander's ability to execute the mission.

²⁹ Robert M. Perito, United States Institute for Peace, "The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan," Special Report; 152 Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2005. p. 3.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 3.

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